The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism

Sober, Elliot (1999) The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism. Philosophy of Science, 66. pp. 542-564.

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Abstract

Reductionism is often understood to include two theses:(1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics;(2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics.These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam(1967, 1975)and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Law, Arts and Social Sciences > School of Humanities
Depositing User: Dr Philip Kime
Date Deposited: 27 Oct 2019 18:49
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2019 18:49
URI: https://eprints.kime.dyndns.org/id/eprint/15

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